What should be the sequence of handling after the login credentials of the content management system are forged

After the login credentials are forged, the order of disposal is more important than the action itself. The correct sequence is: first stop the bleeding, tighten the back-end entry and abnormal traffic; then cut the chain, rotate the signature key to make all existing credentials invalid; then change the account password and clean up the permissions; finally, use backups and logs to check if a backdoor has been left. AnQiCMS has fixed a typical problem in v3.6.6 - when switching sites, the login credentials can be forged. In the official upgrade suggestions, in addition to updating the version, it is also required to rotate the site signature key and change the administrator password, and this sequence itself is a disposal template.

First judge whether the credentials are forged.

The phenomenon of this kind of event is different from ordinary intrusion: the attacker does not need the correct account password, but just needs to obtain a 'legitimate-looking' credential to pass the verification. Suspicions include: configuration changes appear in the background without operation records; abnormal login sources appear in the login log without corresponding failed attempts; the site switching interface is frequently called; a high-authority user is newly created by an account other than the administrator.

It should be reminded that the forgery of credentials is often not an isolated problem, but a chain of exploitation. In the public cases, the cross-site scripting vulnerability on the login page can be used to obtain a session, and then to execute the server-side code, the official has classified such problems very highly and required an immediate upgrade of the version, because the login entry is the first line of defense for the entire site protection.

Why is the handling sequence like this?

Stop the bleeding first. Limit the accessible range of the background entry, for example, only allow office network access, add frequency limits to login and site switching interfaces, and enable captcha interception automation attempts. AnQiCMS is built-in with reCAPTCHA captcha capabilities, form and login entry interfaces can be directly connected, this step can reduce the probability of continued exploitation without interrupting business.

The second step is to break the chain. The forged credentials depend on the signature key used by the server, so changing the administrator's password is not enough to close the risk - old credentials can still be constructed under the condition that the key does not change. Rotating the site signature key will cause all existing sessions and credentials to expire at once, which is the real action of breaking the chain. This step should be arranged within the business tolerance window, as it will kick out the users who are currently logging in.

Step 3: Change passwords and clear permissions. After key rotation, modify the passwords of administrators and high-level account users one by one, check if the permission settings of user groups and VIP groups have been added roles, and delete accounts that are not recognized or have left.

Step 4: Check for leftovers. Compare the current data with the backup before the event occurred, focusing on template files, plugins or extension directories, scheduled tasks, and site settings. AnQiCMS supports data and static file backup and recovery, and comparison and rollback are based on the availability of backups; without backups, this step can only rely on logs, and the conclusion will be unreliable.

What kind of records should be left at each step

The value of emergency response is half in recovery and half in traceability. It is recommended to keep four types of records: discovery time and method; execution time and person of each step; list of objects checked (accounts, permissions, templates, interfaces); and uncertainties that have not been confirmed. When keeping records, be careful not to write sensitive content into the document, such as key values, complete tokens, and operation examples with passwords should not appear in the event report.

How to arrange post-event reinforcement

After the handling is completed, sort the reinforcement according to whether it can be bypassed by a single credential issue:

• Authentication layer: Does JWT authentication and site-level authorization cover all interfaces, including those that seem to only perform site switching?
• Input layer: In addition to content-side sensitive word filtering and anti-crawling interference codes, you also need to confirm whether query parameters are checked against a whitelist, especially easy to miss for sorting parameters;
• Entry layer: Have all forms such as login, registration, and message boards enabled captcha, and is there a limit to the number of failed attempts?
• Recovery layer: Is the backup cycle shorter than the acceptable loss window, and has a real recovery exercise been conducted once?

AnQiCMS v3.6.6 This round of fixes addresses two issues that correspond to the two most easily overlooked areas: list sorting parameter injection (input layer parameter verification) and the login credentials of site switching being forgeable (the scope of authentication). The common point of these issues is that they are all hidden in the 'auxiliary functions' rather than in the main process, so when self-checking, one cannot only test the main chain.

Common questions

Can changing the administrator's password solve the problem?

No. If the old credentials are still usable when the server-side signature key is forged and the key does not change, it is necessary to complete the signature key rotation first, and then change the password for each account.

Can you recover without a backup?

Can be cleaned and strengthened, but it cannot be proven that there are no leftovers. The safe approach in this case is: after strengthening, export the content data and rebuild it to avoid running in an environment that may have been altered.

After the event is handled, should it be verified again?

Yes. The verification method is to reproduce the attack path: try to access with old credentials, check if they have expired; confirm that the rotated key no longer accepts any tokens generated before the rotation, and only then is it considered closed.